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Introduction
Homosexual conduct has existed for many years, but it has be-
come a politically and morally controversial topic in today's society.
Debates rage over the unnaturalness of sexually deviant behavior and
one's right to enjoy freedom of sexual choice and expression.
Laws imposing criminal sanctions on consenting adults who en-
gage in private homosexual behavior are historically longstanding" and
most have withstood constitutional attack.2 Despite the constitutionality
of statutes prohibiting this conduct, courts have recognized the counter-
vailing right of privacy which, although not explicitly provided for in
the United States Constitution, is considered an implicit and substan-
tive right.'
In this emotionally charged, and often misunderstood area, courts
reluctantly confront and resolve the legal issues. First, this comment
considers the legal issues presented when noncommercial homosexual
acts occur privately between consenting adults. Second, this comment
focuses particularly on the legitimacy of the Florida Board of Bar Ex-
aminers' inquiry into the private sexual behavior of a bar applicant as
part of the process in which his fitness to practice law in Florida is
1. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1202-03 (E.D. Va. 1975). In Doe, the court observed the Virginia statute has its
ancestry in Judaic and Christian law, and is immediately traceable to the Code of
Virginia of 1792. Id. at 1202-03.
2. Id. at 1203. See also Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973). See
generally 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 3 (1977).
3. An in-depth discussion of the right of privacy and the recognition of privacy as
a fundamental right under the United States Constitution is beyond the scope of this
comment. But see Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosex-
ual Conduct, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1613 (1974).
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determined.
Background of In re. N.R.S.
The Florida Supreme Court's power and authority to regulate ad-
mission of persons to the practice of law in Florida is derived from the
Florida Constitution.4 The Florida Board of Bar Examiners (Board),
serving as an administrative arm of Florida's Supreme Court performs
regulatory and supervisory functions over Florida's practicing attor-
neys. The Board is answerable solely to the Florida Supreme Court,5
and its authority may neither usurp nor exceed the court's power under
the Florida Constitution.'
As part of its duty to regulate admission of persons to the Florida
bar, the Board is empowered to schedule informal hearings in order to
question the applicant's qualifications. Thus, the Board insures that all
applicants fully comply with the Florida Supreme Court's qualification
criteria before being admitted to practice law in Florida.7
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court, in Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, In re N.R.S.,s explicitly denied the Board authority to.
question an applicant regarding his proclivity towards private homosex-
ual conduct. N.R.S., a member of the New York State Bar, had com-
pleted all parts of the Florida Bar examination successfully. His appli-
cation for admission to the Bar revealed he had been classified 4-F by
the military "either because of a physical problem or because of his
homosexuality." 9 The Board conducted an informal hearing at which
N.R.S. refused to answer questions about his past sexual conduct. He
admitted a "continuing sexual preference for men but . . . indicated
that he had no present intention regarding future homosexual acts."1
4. FLA. CONST. art V, § 15: "The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted."
5. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977).
6. id.
7. FLA. Sup. CT. R. RELATING TO ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Art. II, § 12 (1977).
8. 403 So. 2d 1315.
9. Id. at 1316.
10. Id.
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/6
Homosexuality and Bar Admission6:1982
He further stated he would obey all the laws of Florida.11
Following a review of N.R.S.'s testimony, the Board requested he
return for further questioning. This, he refused to do. Ultimately, the
Board refused to certify his admission to the Florida Bar, conceding
"that, except for the issue of sexual conduct, it (the Board) has no
adverse information concerning petitioner's fitness."1 2 N.R.S. subse-
quently petitioned the Florida Supreme Court seeking its order that the
Board certify his admission to practice.
The issue presented by the case was whether questioning a Florida
Bar applicant about private homosexual activity was rationally related
to proving fitness to practice law.1  The issue is a delicate one,14 and
one recently addressed by other jurisdictions in the context of other
employment areas.1 5 After reconciling the competing arguments, the
Florida Supreme Court refused to sanction the Board's inquiry into the
applicant's private sexual conduct, even though the applicant admitted
a continuing sexual preference for men.1
N.R.S.'s Constitutional Arguments
Florida Statute § 800.02 prohibits "unnatural and lascivious
acts,' 17 and has been construed to include homosexual acts between
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1317.
14. Id. at 1316.
15. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(discharge of homosexual
employed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for immoral conduct
and possession of unsuitable personality traits held violative of substantive due process);
Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969)(male teacher who engaged in non-criminal relationship with another male can-
not be subject to disciplinary proceedings absent showing behavior indicated unfitness
to teach). But see Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wisc. 2d 286, 559 P.2d
1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (public knowledge of male teacher's homosex-
uality impaired his academic efficiency thus constituting sufficient cause for discharge).
16. 403 So. 2d at 1315. The court did sanction further inquiry by the Board, if
the Board in good faith, felt the conduct was other than private, noncommercial and
consensual.
17. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981) reads in part: "Unnatural and lascivious act.
Whoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor of the second degree. .. ."
521 1
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consenting adults.18 In the instant case, N.R.S. alleged the statute
could not be constitutionally applied to private consensual activity be-
tween adults, 19 but in a footnote the court declined to answer this as-
sertion, stating the statute had previously withstood constitutional
attack. 0
In Witherspoon v. State," applicants challenged the constitutional
validity of section 800.02, contending the words "unnatural and lascivi-
ous" contained within the statute were "so vague as to make an ordi-
nary person guess at their meaning, and so broad as to invade the right
to privacy and the constitutional rights of individuals guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Declaration of Rights of the State of Florida. 2 Florida's Supreme
Court answered that the words "unnatural and lascivious" were not
vague, but rather were "of such a character that an ordinary citizen
can easily determine what character of act is intended, and are thus
secure from constitutional attack. '2 Similar statutes in other states
have also withstood constitutional attack.24
Florida statutes set forth guidelines as to who may not practice
law in Florida. The category of excludable applicants includes those
persons "not of good moral character. ' 25 Florida courts have struggled
with the interpretation of the words "good moral character,12 6 as has
the United States Supreme Court.2
In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,28 an applicant was de-
nied admission to the California Bar because he had failed to show he
was a person of good moral character. There was some evidence appli-
18. 278 So. 2d 611.
19. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
20. 403 So. 2d 1315.
21. 278 So. 2d 611.
22. Id. at 612.
23. Id.
24. See generally 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 3 (1977).
25. Florida statutes provide that "[njo sheriff or clerk of any county or deputy of
either, shall practice [law] in this state, nor shall any person not of good moral char-
acter . . . be entitled to practice." FLA. STAT. § 454.18 (1981) (emphasis added).
26. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); State
ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 146 So. 66 (Fla. 1933).
27. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
28. Id.
4
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cant had once been connected with the Communist Party, but the ap-
plicant refused on First Amendment grounds to answer questions about
his political associations and beliefs. The United States Supreme Court
sustained the denial of admission,29 but described the term good moral
character as unusually ambiguous."0 The Court warned that such am-
biguity could "be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discrimina-
tory denial of the right to practice law."31 In order to prevent arbitrary
denial of applicants' admission to the Bar, the United States Supreme
Court held that the standards imposed by the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution must be met.32
Petitioner in In re N.R.S. advanced the argument that he had
been denied due process and equal protection of the law. 3 Under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, government
cannot take away a person's life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law.34 There are two aspects of the due process guarantee: pro-
cedural and substantive. Procedural due process involves an individual's
right to a fair decision-making process, including notice.3 5 N.R.S. ar-
gued he had been denied procedural due process of law because Florida
Bar forms did not give notice that homosexual persons applying for
admission to practice would be subject to questioning about their pri-
vate sex lives.38
Petitioner also asserted that he had not been afforded equal pro-
29. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
30. Id. at 263.
31. Id.
32. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); U.S. CONST..
amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Brief for Petitioner at 18, 23; 403 So. 2d 1315.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A discussion on the Court's interpretation of
the phrase "life, liberty, and property" is beyond the scope of this comment. See gener-
ally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383, 478 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
35. NOWAK, supra note 34 at 383, 499.
36. See Brief for Petitioner at 18; 403 So. 2d 1315. Substantive due process is
"[t]he right to be free from irrational and capricious government conduct resulting in
deprivation of life, liberty or property." J. Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory
Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA
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tection of the laws.37 The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 38 guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be af-
forded equal treatment by the government.3 9 N.R.S. argued that "simi-
larly situated individuals" described all applicants to the Florida Bar,
whether heterosexual or homosexual. Since the Florida statute pro-
scribing "unnatural and lascivious acts" 40 had been applied to heter-
osexuals as well as homosexuals, 41 N.R.S. asserted that equal protec-
tion prohibited the Board from inquiring into his private sexual
behavior since the Board did not delve into the private sex lives of
heterosexuals. 2
In addition to the procedural due process and equal protection
constitutional challenges, petitioner asserted that inquiry into his pri-
vate sexual behavior violated his right to privacy under the United
States Constitution.43 Commentators recognized a right of privacy as
early as 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote a
person's privacy should be protected from intrusion by newspapers.4
Articulating what would later become a foundation for today's right of
privacy, Brandeis dissented in 1928 from the majority's view and wrote
that a person should be prohibited from government intrusion into his
private life.4
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
the right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of pri-
vacy implicit in the express guarantees of the Constitution."8 The right
of privacy has been viewed by the Court as an element of "liberty"
37. See Brief for Petitioner at 23; 402 So. 2d 1315; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. NOWAK, supra note 32, at 519.
40. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
41. Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975).
42. See Brief for Petitioner at 22-23; 403 So. 2d 1315.
43. Id. at 16.
44. S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of women during some
stages of pregnancy to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right of unmarried individuals to obtain contraceptives).
1524 Nova Law Journal
6:19821
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 In the landmark decision,
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court found that the "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras .. .various guarantees create
zones of privacy."4 8 Griswold's "zones of privacy" emerged from such
fundamental constitutional guarantees as the First Amendment, limit-
ing forced disclosure of speech and association; the Third Amendment,
protecting a person from forced quartering of a soldier during peace-
time; the Fourth and Fifth Amendments limiting the extent to which
the government may demand information from a person; and the Ninth
Amendment, which guarantees that enumerated constitutional rights
shall not be construed as limiting other rights of the people.49 Thus, by
interpreting the specific constitutional guarantees as creating zones of
privacy, the extrapolated right of privacy was recognized as a funda-
mental right. 0
It is interesting to note that on November 4, 1980, Floridians
voted to amend the state Constitution,51 adding Article I, section 23,
which provides that every person has "[t]he right to be let alone and
free from government intrusion into his private life."'52 Had petitioner
brought his cause of action after the general election, he could have
asserted an explicit right of privacy under the Florida Constitution, and
that the Board's investigation constituted an unreasonable intrusion
into his private life. This argument was not raised in petitioner's brief,
presumably because the brief was filed prior to passage of the privacy
amendment. The court's opinion followed the amendment. While it
cannot be conclusively determined from the language of the N.R.S.
opinion, it is possible that the court foresaw the impact of Florida's new
section 23 and on that ground determined petitioner's right of privacy
47. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 39 (1923) ("liberty" includes right to marry,
establish a home, bring up children, and in general, enjoy those privileges essential to
an orderly pursuit of happiness); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(recognizing "liberty" includes parents' right to direct their children's upbringing and
education).
48. 381 U.S. 479, 484.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. G. Cope, A Quick Look At Florida's New Right of Privacy, 55 FLA. B.J. 12
(1981).
52. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
525 1Homosexuality and Bar AdmissionI 6:1982
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warranted protection from intrusion by the Florida Board of Bar Ex-
aminers. By resting its decision on the grounds that private noncom-
mercial sexual acts between consenting adults are not relevant to fitness
to practice law, the court apparently protected petitioner's right of pri-
vacy as explicitly written in the new Florida Constitution.
The constitutional arguments asserted by petitioner are not new. It
has been suggested by other courts that prohibition of homosexual be-
havior, even private homosexual behavior, may infringe on the right of
privacy, 53 deny equal protection, 54 and impair due process requirements
regarding liberty. 55 The Florida Supreme Court did not, however, ad-
dress petitioner's arguments asserted on these constitutional grounds.
Apparently, the court avoided the constitutional issues in keeping with
its rule56 to dispose of cases, where possible, without adjudication of
constitutional issues.57
Fitness to Practice Law
In addition to constitutional arguments, N.R.S. claimed the
Board's inquiry into his private consensual sexual behavior was not ra-
tionally related to prove fitness to practice law.58 Traditionally, states
grant bar examiners wide powers to regulate bar admission, but these
powers are not without restriction.59
As early as 1889, courts recognized that where an attorney's con-
duct did not affect his professional integrity, a board of bar examiners
could not suspend an attorney, even though that conduct might be "ir-
regular."60 Similary, "if the act does not disclose moral turpitude in the
perpetrator rendering him unfit to be entrusted with the confidences
53. Acanfora v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 259 F. Supp. 843 (D.
Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974); 417 F.2d 1161.
54. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973).
55. Id.
56. Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1970).
57. Id.
58. See Brief for Petitioner at 6; 403 So. 2d 1315.
59. 353 U.S. 232.
60. State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 25, 28, 10 S.E. 408, 410 (1889) (conduct
of attorney who published false and libelous charge against judge in newspaper held
insufficient misconduct to disbar).
8
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and duties of the profession, it cannot appropriately be made the basis
of disbarment." 6'
According to the United States Supreme Court in Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners"2 "[a] State can require . . . good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the ap-
plicant's fitness . . . to practice law." 3 In N.R.S., petitioner asserted
that homosexual activity was "hardly dishonorable conduct relevant to
the legal profession,"64 and that such conduct cast no doubt on his in-
tegrity, honesty, and fairness.6"
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners' Position
The Board defended its inquiry into possible homosexual conduct
as an appropriate means of protecting the public and of maintaining
the integrity of the legal profession. The Board noted that it is an attor-
ney's sworn duty to uphold the laws of the state in which he practices,
including sodomy statutes and laws proscribing homosexual conduct.
Florida, along with twenty-two other states, has a criminal statute
prohibiting homosexual conduct. 6
The Board argued that questioning the applicant about his private
sexual conduct was relevant to determine "whether the applicant in-
tends to disobey the laws of Florida which he seeks to be be sworn to
uphold. 6 7 The Board suggested "that an applicant's past homosexual
acts are relevent to determine whether past conduct will prevent him
from achieving the social acceptance necessary to enable him to dis-
charge his professional responsibilities."68
In response to petitioner's privacy argument, the Board asserted
that the Florida Supreme Court had followed the United States Su-
61. Bartos v. United States Dist. Court, 19 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1927).
62. 353 U.S. 232.
63. Id. at 239.
64. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6; 403 So. 2d 1315.
65. Id. at 6.
66. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981). See generally K. Lasson, Homosexual Rights:
The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 BALT. L. REV. 47 (1979).
67. 403 So. 2d 1315.
68. Id. at 1317.
5271
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extend to homosexuals.70
The Court's Disposition
The Florida Supreme Court in In re N.R.S. stated: "Private non-
commercial sex acts between adults are not relevant to prove fitness to
practice law,"17 1 but did not specifically address the constitutional issues
raised by petitioner. However, the court used constitutional due process
language in reaching its decision. Holding that unless the Board
demonstrated, in good faith, a need to question further the petitioner
about other sexual conduct (i.e., conduct that was commercial, public
or nonconsensual), inquiries were to be limited to those "bear[ing] a
rational relationship to an applicant's fitness to practice law."1 2
The words, "rational relationship" are trademarks of the oft-
quoted minimal scrutiny test employed by the courts in assessing
whether due process and equal protection of the law have been vio-
lated.73 The means chosen under this test must be reasonably corre-
lated to the ends sought, and in N.R.S., the court concluded the
Board's inquiry failed to meet even this standard. Presumably then, no
reason existed for applying the "strict scrutiny" standard which is in-
voked only when a suspect class or fundamental right is involved.74
The argument could be made, however, that because the right of
privacy was, at least to some extent, involved in In re N.R.S., and be-
cause the right of privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right,
that is, a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, ' '75 the stricter standard
69. See Brief for Respondent at 3; 403 So. 2d 1315. See also Doe, 403 F. Supp.
1199; Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
70. See Brief for Respondent at 3; 403 So. 2d 1315.
71. 403 So. 2d at 1317.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the minimal scrutiny
test employed by the Court, see generally NOWAK, supra note 34; Friedman supra
note 36.
74. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny test employed
by the Court, see generally NOWAK supra note 34; Friedman, supra note 36.
75. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (footnotes omitted).
1528 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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of review76 should have been invoked. Petitioner did not advance this
argument, nor did the court apply the stricter test, choosing instead to
hold implicitly the inquiry by the board failed to meet the rational rela-
tionship test, the lowest standard of review.
The court's opinion gives very little basis for its decision other than
the lack of a rational relationship between the Board's inquiry and at-
torney's fitness to practice law. The court considered the issue care-
fully, obviously recognizing its delicacy. 7 In the words of the court: "A
lawyer should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from
all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in
society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen
public confidence in the legal profession."17 8 The court stressed the im-
portance of lawyers leading law abiding lives in order to maintain the
dignity associated with the legal profession and in keeping with the at-
torney's sworn duty to uphold the law.
The Board's concern is that the applicant for bar admission be
morally, as well as legally, responsible. Thus, good moral character
must be demonstrated before an applicant is admitted to the bar.79 The
definition given the term "good moral character" is considered unusu-
ally ambiguous, and the United States Supreme Court has warned
against its arbitrary use.8 0
Included in the Florida Supreme Court's definition of good moral
character are "conduct or acts which historically [do not] constitute an
act of moral turpitude."81 "Moral turpitude involves the idea of inher-
ent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed
by man to man or by man to society .... ,,12 "The sole purpose of
these requirements is to protect the public."83 Additionally, "[tihe lay-
man must have confidence that he has employed an attorney who will
represent his interests . . .[and] if an applicant has committed certain
illegal acts in the past, he may represent a future peril to society which
76. 381 U.S. 479.
77. 403 So. 2d 1315.
78. FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1978).
79. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
80. 353 U.S. 252.
81. 364 So. 2d 454.
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would justify denying the applicant admission."8 4
All attorneys are not of impeccable background, nor are they in-
fallible. Recognizing this, the Board has admitted persons to practice
who have violated laws,85 or engaged in unethical conduct86 at some
point in their lives. Similarly, attorneys who have been suspended from
practice for illegal conduct have subsequently been re-admitted to prac-
tice.8 7 Thus, conduct that may be unethical or illegal may not involve
an offense of moral turpitude for which a person should be excluded
from the practice of law.
In a 1978 advisory opinion requested by the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, Florida Board of Bar Examiners v. Eimers,8" the Florida
Supreme Court considered the relationship between homosexuality and
fitness to practice law. In Eimers, the applicant for admission had
passed all parts of the Florida Bar Examination, but had admitted his
preference for homosexuality during questioning at a hearing before
the Board. The applicant was not asked about any specific acts he may
have engaged in nor was there any evidence proving the applicant had
acted or planned to act on his sexual preference. The court stated that
in order to determine the reasonableness of the relationship between
homosexual orientation and fitness to practice law, consideration must
be given the purpose for ostracizing the morally unfit.89 The court
stated that an attorney's mere preference for homosexuality did not
constitute a threat to the Board's objective of protecting the public
84. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978).
85. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978) (debts
incurred later discharged by bankruptcy are not basis for denial of admission to Bar
where not incurred with reckless disregard for payment); In re Florida Bd. of Bar Ex-
aminers, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966) (conviction of petty larceny does not deprive indi-
vidual of right to be admitted to the practice of law, if otherwise qualified).
86. 365 So. 2d 164; 183 So. 2d 688.
87. The Fla. Bar v. Davis, 361 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1978) (issuance of worthless
checks constitutes unethical conduct by an attorney warranting suspension for twelve
months); The Fla. Bar v. Blalock, 325 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1976) (attorney suspended for
misappropriating funds will be reinstated when restitution made); In re Hill, 298 So.
2d 161 (Fla. 1974) (one year suspension for issuance of worthless checks and alcohol
problems).
88. 358 So. 2d 7, 9.
89. Id.
12
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from those morally unfit to practice law,90 and further, that homosex-
ual behavior among consenting adults did not render a person unable to
"live up to and perform . . . professional duties and responsibilities as-
signed to members of The Bar." '
In addition, the Eimers' court found the record devoid of evidence
which suggested a preference for homosexual behavior among con-
senting adults was "indicative of character baseness." 2 Implicit in this
statement is the message that homosexual conduct, while proscribed by
Florida's criminal law is moral turpitude of the degree which renders a
person unfit to practice law. Since under Eimers, private consensual
homosexual conduct was not deemed an offense of moral turpitude for
which a person should be denied admission to the bar, it follows that
inquiry into such conduct is not rationally related to fitness to practice
law.
Two strong dissents in N.R.S. present the competing arguments.93
As stated by Justice Boyd, "[h]omosexual acts are prohibited by the
criminal law." ' The state legislature is not prohibited "by any consti-
tutional principle of due process, equal protection, or privacy"9 5 from
enacting laws intended to "protect the public health, welfare, safety,
and morals." 96
Since the issue in N.R.S. was not whether the Board can deny
admission to someone who admits an orientation towards homosexual
lifestyle, but rather whether the Board can question the applicant as to
his private sexual activity, Justice Boyd stated that "[e]ven without evi-
dence of actual conduct, I am opposed to the admission of any person
whose admitted 'orientation' indicates a lifestyle likely to involve rou-
tine violation of a criminal statute." 7 Although the mere "likelihood"
of routine violation of the law is arguably weak grounds for denying an
applicant admission to the bar, Justice Boyd felt further inquiry into
petitioner's past and planned conduct would have been useful and
90. Id.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. 403 So. 2d 1315.
94. Id. at 1317.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1318.
531 1
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proper. Justice Boyd also stated that he would deny admission to any-
one whose lifestyle involved routine violation of legislatively defined
standards of moral conduct, 8 and believed the court had invaded the
province of the legislature.99
The majority made no attempt to reconcile this viewpoint with
their decision. Ignoring the competing argument, the court held that
inquiry into an applicant's "orientation" to private consensual homo-
sexual conduct was beyond the Board's purview, even though, as Jus-
tice Boyd stated, such conduct is violative of a criminal statute.100 The
majority denied the Board authority to determine through further ques-
tioning, whether petitioner's past conduct involved violation of a crimi-
nal statute.101 Instead, the court seemed to rely on petitioner's assertion
that he would obey the laws of Florida and that he had no present
intention regarding future homosexual conduct. Thus, the possibility
exists that an applicant who may have violated a Florida criminal law
will be admitted to practice in Florida, without further determination
of the frequency or seriousness of the past behavior.
Justice Alderman's separate dissent in N.R.S. addressed the dan-
ger of admitting to the bar persons who may have violated the law. He
stated that further inquiry was relevant in the area of homosexual con-
duct just as it would be into any other area of illegal or immoral con-
duct.10 2 Without futher inquiry into petitioner's private homosexual
conduct, Alderman argued the Board would be unable to determine
with certainty the applicant's moral fitness. Further investigation by
the Board may well have revealed the nature and extent of petitioner's
past and planned conduct. However, since in the majority's view orien-
tation or proclivity towards a homosexual lifestyle is not grounds for
denial of admission to the Bar, any inquiry with regard to such private




100. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
101. Id.
102. 403 So. 2d 1315.
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Implications
The Florida Supreme Court has refused to sanction questioning of
a Florida Bar applicant regarding his or her private, noncommercial
sexual conduct even though their behavior may be in violation of Flor-
ida law.10 3 Such private conduct, the court held, is not rationally re-
lated to fitness to practice law in Florida.
The court's refusal to grant the Board authority to further inquire
into petitioner's private sexual behavior is apparently grounded in the
belief that orientation or mere preference for a homosexual lifestyle is
not an offense of moral turpitude or behavior which renders a person
unable to meet the standard of good moral character.
Arguably, some conduct which is illegal is not conduct demon-
strating moral turpitude. Current Florida law deems cohabitation to be
a violation of the law. 10' Despite this status of the law, no applicant has
been denied admission to the Florida Bar in recent years because of
cohabitation. Apparently, although this conduct is illegal in Florida, it
is not conduct involving moral turpitude nor conduct which fails to
meet the standard of good moral character, and thus, not grounds for
denial of admission to the bar.
The dissenters' opinions are grounded in Florida's criminal law.
The dissenters were concerned about past and possible future violations
of the criminal statute by petitioner. While at first blush the reasoning
of the dissent appears practical, a closer examination reveals the im-
practicality of the position. The dissenters apparently would have the
definition of good moral character narrowed to law abiding. Such rea-
soning in effect would allow admission to the bar only to those individu-
als who could evidence a strict compliance with Florida's criminal stat-
utes. Anyone who had violated any law in Florida would be subject to
Board inquiry and investigation regardless of whether the offense met
with the Board's definition of conduct involving moral turpitude. How-
ever, since moral turpitude is the standard which the Board applies in
screening candidates for admission, inquiry into an area for which ad-
mission cannot be denied would be irrelevant and not rationally related
to fitness to practice law.
103. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
104. FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (1981).
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Conclusion
The court in N.R.S. apparently felt the petitioner's preference for
a homosexual lifestyle was not conduct demonstrating moral turpitude
such that it warranted denying his admission to the bar. Consequently,
the court concluded any inquiry into his private sexual behavior would
be irrelevant. However, since no clear rationale for its conclusion is
stated, one must surmise and draw inferences regarding the reasoning
and logic underlying the result. The majority opinion denied the Board
authority to further question N.R.S. about his private homosexual be-
havior since this was not rationally related to his fitness to practice law,
but the opinion fails to explain why such inquiry is not rationally
related.
While the dissenters' view appears legally sound in that homosex-
ual behavior is violative of Florida's criminal law, their approach is
fraught with impracticalities because their inquiry would extend into
areas for which an applicant cannot be denied admission. The major-
ity's opinion takes the more practical approach but leaves unanswered
the assertion that such inquiry violates due process, equal protection,
and the right to privacy. Without elaborating why private homosexual
behavior is unrelated to fitness to practice law, the court denied the
Board authority to inquire into this area.
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